We present a quantum probabilistic encryption algorithm for a private-key encryption scheme based on conjugate coding of the qubit string. A probabilistic encryption algorithm is generally adopted in public-key encryption protocols. Here we consider the way it increases the unicity distance of both classical and quantum private-key encryption schemes. The security of quantum probabilistic privatekey encryption schemes against two kinds of attacks is analyzed. By using the no-signalling postulate, we show that the scheme can resist attack to the key. The scheme's security against plaintext attack is also investigated by considering the information-theoretic indistinguishability of the encryption scheme. Finally, we make a conjecture regarding Breidbart's attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Public-key cryptosystems were first proposed in the 1970s [1] [2] . Because the original public-key encryption schemes were not secure under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA), Goldwasser and Micali introduced the idea of probabilistic encryption [3] in 1984. Up till now, both quantum public-key encryption [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] and deterministic quantum private-key encryption [9] [10] [11] have been investigated. In this paper, we first present a classical private-key encryption scheme with a probabilistic algorithm, then design a quantum probabilistic algorithm for a private-key encryption scheme. We shall show that the probabilistic algorithm can increase the unicity distance of both classical and quantum encryption schemes [12] .
Breidbart's attack on the four-state quantum cryptography scheme has been discussed for many years now. Bennett et al [13] proved that Breidbart's attack is weaker than regular basis eavesdropping; Huttner and Ekirt [14] showed that it is more effective after performing a standard error correction; Yang, Wu, and Liu [15] improved the second result with an extended BB84 QKD protocol. These results are based on the effective average Alice/Eve mutual information. In this paper, we show that the POVM of Breidbart's attack yields the maximum classical trace distance. This implies that Breidbart's attack is the best measurement for the quantum bit string.
II.THE QUANTUM PROBABILISTIC PRIVATE-KEY ENCRYPTION SCHEME

Classical private-key encryption scheme with probabilistic algorithm
Let the triplet (E, S, D) be a classical private-key encryption scheme, where E, D are two polynomial-time classical algorithms, and S is a set of classical keys. We construct the classical probabilistic private-key encryption scheme as a quintet ( 
Since there is more than one plaintext left after decryption, Bob has to select one, making use of the redundancy of plaintext. A similar type of public-key encryption scheme has been considered by Rabi [16] .
For the encryption algorithm defined by (E, S, D), assume time complexities 1 t for E, 2 t for D , 3 t for λ H , and 4 t for 1 λ − H :
1) The new complexity for encryption is 1 3 ( ) n t t × + .
2) The new complexity for decryption is
3) The new complexity for exhaustive attack is
This result shows that raising polynomial time complexity in encryption and decryption leads to exponentially growing time complexity for exhaustive attack.
Quantum probabilistic privatekey encryption scheme
Assume the two parties Alice and Bob share a bit string 1 The plaintexts are 1 2 , , n m m m m =
. Alice encrypts them bit by bit as follows:
[Encryption E] 1) Alice randomly selects ( )
2) Alice prepares the quantum state
3) Alice sends the state i m φ to Bob.
The density operator of the ciphertext encrypted from i m is
After receiving the ciphertexts, Bob measures them using the private key. We see that the state Bob gets is 
III. ATTACK TO THE KEY
If we assume that the plaintext is completely random, we obtain the following: Lemma 1. If Eve had any method F for accessing the information in the key from the ciphertext state, this would contradict the nosignalling postulate. Because the plaintext is truly random, the i r must also be truly random.
Assuming Eve had a method F that could gain information about the key from the state of the ciphertext, so that (| ) s F r s 〉 = , then Alice and Eve could achieve superluminal signalling with the entangled channel. For k = 1, the superluminal signalling process would be as follows:
[Superluminal signalling] 1) Alice prepares the entangled state φ = ( ) 2 00 11 2 + , sends one part of it to Eve, and keeps the other part for herself.
2) If b = 0, when Alice wants to transmit the information b, she uses the basis 0 , 1 to measure the qubit she kept. Then φ will collapse to 00 or 11 with probability 1/2 for each, and at the same time, the qubit Eve gets will collapse to 0 0 or 0 1 with probability 1/2 for each.
3) If b = 1, the basis used to measure the qubit is + , − . Then φ will collapse to + + or − − with probability 1/2 for each, so the qubit Eve gets will collapse to 1 0 or 1 1 with probability 1/2 for each.
4) Eve uses F to get the basis of the qubit, with the result (| )
Hence Alice and Eve achieve superluminal signalling. If Alice wants to transmit more bits, she can share more entangled states and repeat this scheme time after time. The random collapse corresponds to the random distribution of the plaintexts.
As superluminal signalling is not allowed by the no-signalling postulate, there can be no such F.
When the plaintexts have a random distribution, direct attack on the key can be used to build a superluminal signalling scheme. In fact, the plaintexts cannot have this property. In this context, we thus make the following conjecture:
Conjecture 2. If the plaintexts m have a pseudo-random distribution, direct attack on the key s should not be possible. This conjecture implies that, in order to make the scheme secure, we can transform the plaintext by a one-way trapdoor permutation such as RSA. On the basis of this conjecture, we get the following corollary: Corollary 3. The scheme can resist attack to the key if the plaintext m has pseudo-random distribution.
IV. ATTACK TO THE PLAINTEXT
If Eve successfully attacks the information in the key s with method F, she can of course get the information in the plaintexts m. But even if Eve has a method G for accessing the information in m, this does not mean that she can get the information in s. We will show that Eve also has no such G.
Indistinguishability
Goldrich defined indistinguishability for the classical private-key encryption scheme [17] .
Here we define information-theoretic indistinguishability for a quantum private-key encryption scheme. Definition 1. A quantum encryption scheme (G, E, D) is information-theoretically indistinguishable if, for every quantum circuit family { } n C , for every positive polynomial ( ) p ⋅ , for all sufficiently large n, and for every ,
where the encryption algorithm E should be a quantum algorithm, G is an internal coin tosser for the algorithm, and the ciphertexts E(x), E(y) are quantum states. Remark 1. In Subsection 5.5.2 of Ref. [17] , Goldrich states that his definition of indistinguishability for the classical private-key encryption scheme is computational when the classical circuit family is polynomial-size, and information-theoretic when the classical circuit family was no limits on size. This classification can also be extended to semantic security and non-malleability. It should be noted that the physical security here concerns the protocol, it is different from the physical security of the system, which means physical isolation of the security system. For example, the quantum bit commitment protocol in [18] is a physically secure scheme, because the unitary matrix for the attack operation is physically incomputable.
In fact, physical security of algorithms can satisfy all the security requirements of human beings. Next, we give a sufficient condition for information-theoretic indistinguishability. Proof: here we follow the proof of Theorem 1 in Ref. [18] . Define x S as the set of all states Eve could receive when the plaintext is x. For every quantum circuit family{ } 
where σ is the density operator of service bits of n C . Similarly, 
it follows that
which, according to Definition 1, proves the theorem.
Analysis of the scheme
In the scheme, r is a random string selected by Alice, so r and the private key s are unknown to Eve. Let It can be seen that 
This trace distance refers to the encryption of one bit. As the security of the scheme is based on the trace distance between two plaintext states encrypted from any bit strings x and y, there must be an upper bound n k determined by the length of the key s such that, when the length of plaintexts x and y is less than n k , the scheme can satisfy
This bound, which makes the scheme secure, has not yet been worked out.
V. QUANTUM UNICITY DISTANCE
Even if the plaintexts have been coded with a one-way trapdoor permutation which makes them pseudo-random, they should still have redundancy. So when the ciphertexts encrypted by the same key are long enough, the scheme must be attacked by trying every possible key, which means our scheme has a limited unicity distance [19] .
Assume that attacker Eve can distinguish a pseudo-random string when it is longer than a sufficiently large N. On this premise, if Eve gets more than 2 k k N × × ciphertext states, she can divided them into 2 k groups, each corresponding to more than N plaintexts. Eve can then decrypt these groups of ciphertext states with 2 k different bit strings taken from the respective key space. While the unique key yields a pseudo-random string, other keys all yield a random string. Finally, Eve will distinguish the decrypted string and access the private key.
Besides N, the quantum unicity distance of our scheme is at least an exponential function of k. This result is based on the improvement due to probabilistic encryption.
On the other hand, for a quantum deterministic private-key encryption scheme, the unicity distance should be much less than that of our scheme. We adopt a scheme based on the quantum private channel, for example.
The encryption process can be represented by
where 1 s and 2 s are a pair of keys, so that the private key with length k can encrypt 2 k bits each time.
Similarly, we assume that Eve can distinguish a pseudo-random string whenever its length is more than a sufficiently large N. This time she does not need as many as Although these key ciphertexts may be nonadjacent, it would take little more than N ciphertext states to distinguish a pseudo-random string. However, it should be noted that 2k N × is much smaller than 2 k k N × × .
From this result, we see that the quantum unicity distance of the quantum deterministic private-key encryption scheme may be ( ) O k × N , which is much smaller than the quantum unicity distance for the probabilistic case, viz.,
VI. BREIDBART'S ATTACK
There exists a way [18] to calculate the upper bound of the trace distance of 0 ρ and 1 ρ defined in Eq. (13) . Let Following Refs. [20] [21] [22] , it can be shown that
We define a trace-preserving quantum operation U with operation elements
where,
H is unit operator, and 1 H is the Hadamard operator It is well known that ( ) ( ) 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a quantum probabilistic encryption algorithm for a private-key encryption scheme based on conjugate coding. We first proved that our scheme can resist attack to the key, invoking the no-signalling postulate. Second, we investigated the scheme's security against plaintext attack, appealing to the concept of information-theoretic indistinguishability of the encryption scheme. Third, we showed that, compared with the quantum deterministic private-key encryption scheme, probabilistic encryption greatly increases the unicity distance. Finally, a conjecture was made regarding Breidbart's attack. 
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